Fester's Place has done sort of a counter to my analysis that Al Queda has been kicked pretty hard in the nuts lately.
The thing I think he's missing is that the estimates I see of insurgency size from the Brooking's report are obviously completely made up. So doing any sort of analysis of the difference between a hard number like the number of insurgents reported “detained or killed” and the insurgency size is pretty meaningless. For that matter, I think the estimates of the number of insurgents “detained or killed” is too soft as well, because I doubt that 100% of all those those numbers are guilty.
That's the problem with “enemy body count” numbers, which is why I avoid those portions of the Brookings report.
The other issue is that the numbers have no way to reflect commitment to the “cause”. If we keep hitting the leadership as we've been doing, eventually the only people left will be as effective as well, the Howard Dean Presidential campaign...
So if the insurgency had a million members, but didn't hurt anybody and just were members of the “Saddam Hussien for President” party, that wouldn't bother me; that's probably even a win condition for the US.

Comments (2)
OB —- I agree that Brookings estimates are just that —- estimates with large error bands because no one has any good intel, and I also agree that if you conceptualize counterinsurgency as similiar to a repetitive RICO takedown of a Mafia family where the first time does not matter, the second round of indictments shows some diminished op. capacity, but the real pay-off is the 6th or 7th round of indictments ten years from the start of the operation because the only people left to be “promoted” are the complete incompetent.
However even this modified attrition strategy only works when the target of the strategy can not replicate and regenerate its competency and sustainment measures faster than they lose those current capabilities. Reuters is reporting that US intel officials believe that Zarquawi’s organization is now self-sustaining and can recruit and train as fast or faster than they are being killed, captured or demotivated.
On the point of committment, let us back out the numbers and agree that the insurgency has taken very heavy losses that normally would break most conventional military forces without assigning numbers to that, and these losses are predictable, regular and recurring. Yet they are still fighting, increasing their technical capability, developping a political front, and exploiting the cleavage between the Sunni Arab population and the rest of the Iraqi population to maintain internal political, logistical, financial and military support. That to me indicates a resilent organization with plenty of committed members. Your interpretation may vary, but this rough description of fact of the past two years should be close enough for the two of us to agree upon.
Posted by fester | September 28, 2005 10:28 AM
Posted on September 28, 2005 10:28
I do think Al Qaeda is losing, because while support may be growing in regions that have not yet seen conflict, it is draining where people have seen what Al Qaeda does to society. The Al Majd broadcast of Ahmad Al-Shaye’s interview is starting to educate Saudi’s about the war in Iraq. If you watch the interview, its very interesting to see what Ahmad Al-Shaye’ thought the war was like, based on Al Qaeda’s propaganda.
As far as the IED numbers trending down, the military has finally uparmored enough Humvees that they no longer allow un-uparmored vehicles to leave bases. This has resulted in a drastic drop in US deaths, and a resultant increase in civilian deaths as terrorists retarget weaker opponents. The long-term side effect is more Iraqis lose friends and family members to these indescriminate attacks, and support to Al Qaeda wanes.
Posted by Nervous Rodent | October 2, 2005 6:23 PM
Posted on October 2, 2005 18:23