The Opinionated Bastard

For one thing, its clear that the administration was not of one mind about lots of things, and that the President had some tough decisions to work out. It's also clear that the British were worried too:

Despite sanctions, Iraq continues to develop WMD, although our intelligence is poor. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened, though there is no greater threat now than in recent years that Saddam will use WMD; and Saddam’s brutal regime remains in power and destablizes [sic] the Arab and wider Islamic world. [...] Iraq has up to 20 650km-range missiles left over from Gulf War. These are capable of hitting Israel and the Gulf states. Design work for other ballistic missiles over the UN limit of 150km continues. Iraq continues with its BW and CW programmes and, if it has not already done so could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including in ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme.

They too were skeptical of sanctions:

1. But some of the difficulties with the existing policy still apply; those states in breach of sanctions will want compensation if they are to change tack; • Saddam is only likely to permit the return of inspectors if he believes the threat of large scale US military action is imminent and that such concessions would prevent the US from acting decisively. Playing for time, he would then embark on a renewed policy of non co-operation; and • Although containment has held for the past decade, Iraq has progressively increased its international engagement. Even if the GRL makes sanctions more sustainable the sanctions regime could collapse in the long-term.

2. Tougher containment would not re-integrate Iraq into the international community as it offers little prospect of removing Saddam. He will continue with his WMD programmes, destabilizing the Arab and Islamic world, and impoverishing his people. But there is no greater threat now that he will use WMD than there has been in recent years, so continuing containment is an option.

From Manning's Dinner with Condi:

From what [Condoleeza Rice] said, Bush has yet to find the answers to the big questions:

• how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified;

• what value to put on the exiled Iraqi opposition

• how to coordinate a US/allied military campaign with internal opposition (assuming there is any)

• what happens on the morning after?

That's interesting, because it means that the Administration was trying to work this stuff out in March of 2002.

The administration didn't quite know what to do with Chalabi:

I asked for Wolfowitz's take on the stuggle inside the Administration between the pro- and anti- INC lobbies (well documented in Sy Hersh's recent New Yorker piece, which I gave you). He said that he found himself between the two sides (but as the conversation developed, it became clear that Wolfowitz was far more pro-INC than not). He said that he was strongly opposed to what some were advocating: a coalition including all outside factions except the INC (INA, KDP, PUK, SCIRI). This would not work. Hostility towards the INC was in reality hostility towards Chalabi. It was true that Chalabi was not the easiest person to work with. Bute had a good record in bringing high-grade defectors out of Iraq. The CIA stubbornly refused to recognise this. They unreasonably denigrated the INC because of their fixation with Chalabi. When I mentioned that the INC was penetraded by Iraqi intelligence, Wolfowitz commented that this was probably the case with all the opposition groups: it was something we would have to live with.

It was the British who pushed towards defining the issue in terms of WMD:

For Iraq, “regime change” does not stack up. It sound like a grudge between Bush and Saddam. Much better, as you have suggested, to make the objective ending the threat to the international community from Iraq WMD before Saddam uses it or gives it to terrorists. This is at once easier to justify in terms of international law but also more demanding. Regime change which produced another Sunni General still in charge of an active Iraqi WMD programme would be a bad outcome (not least because it would be almost impossible to maintain UN sanctions on a new leader who came in promising a fresh start). As with the fight against UBL, Bush would do well to de “personalise the objective” focus on elimination of WMD, and show that he is serious about UN Inspectors as the first choice means of achieving that (it is win/win for him: either Saddam against all the odds allows Inspectors to operate freelyk in which case we can further hobble his WMD programmes or he blocks/hinders and we are on stronger ground for switching to other methods).

The British understood us well:

If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now be considering military action against Iraq. In addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL [Usama Bin Laden] and Al Qaida. Objectively the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September. What has however changed is the tolerance of the international community (especially that of the US), the world having witnessed on September 11 just what determined evil people can these days perpetuate.

The so called smoking gun:

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

It kind of sounds to me like the British and the US got together and discussed Iraq, especially in light of 9/11. President Bush, feeling like Saddam was a gun pointed at the US, didn't really like the current options. The British were willing to go along with getting rid of Saddam, but the US fumbled the justification part. Though they were getting bad advice from Britain:

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.