The Opinionated Bastard

Bastard —- Thank you for the compliment, and I still strongly disagree with your assertion that the shift to IEDs is a sign of weakness in the insurgency, especially if the responses of these two battalions in the 3ID is common through US units. IEDs are single used weapons, so if units are getting hit with significant IEDs to the point that they no longer go down certain roads and change patrol patterns to only keeping a single supply route open,it strongly suggests a competent logistical system by the IED makers.

I am arguing that straight up, the insurgencies in urban terrain can go man to man against Iraqi police forces, and most data that the Iraqi Ministry of Defense has released suggests this is true. This is due to a combination of equalized firepower (IIRC the Iraqi Army has under 50 working T-55/T59 tanks plus another 75 or so Hungarian imported T-72s that are not yet in country), and superior military tradition on the Sunni Arab part of the insurgency. Throw in fighting on home terrain and working within an urban environment, the Iraqi Army, can not take Sunni cities, and the insurgents can not take the Shi’ite or Kurdish dominated urban areas either. However, throw in heavy US airpower, artillery and armor, and the equation rapidly changes.

If IED attacks can channelize US forces to predictable routes, and confine US forces to firebases and supply hubs, then the cities and countryside get a whole lot more contestable.

Remember, the insurgency has a much easier job of disproving security than the government forces have in proving security and thus providing an environment where cooperation/informing for the government is less dangerous than not doing so. That job is much easier for the insurgents if US forces are confined to bases or predictable patrol regions, and if IEDs are able to do that, they accomplish their mission from the insurgent’s point of view.

Finally, going back to what you commented on over at my place, there are more announced battalion sized operations by the II MEF in the Upper Euphrates Valley, but I think that this is a combination of better PR and smaller units acting. The two cases I pulled out were both in the 3rd ID AOR.

Yep, we’ll have to see. However, the US Military knows the military logic even better then we do Fester, so we’ll have to see. Lulling people into a false sense of security works as well. Perhaps the US Military need not risk patrols like they used to?

IED deaths in October were 40 through October 26th, which is pretty close to the standard since June of this year. So there’s no huge increase. Perhaps there’s more going on in Baghdad then before though?

I really wish we could get more statistics on what’s going on.